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Abstract
The paper raises geographic and political issues of Europe, analyses inte-
gration processes that will take place when Central and Eastern European coun-
tries join the European Union. The author arrives at conclusion that new country-
members will gain advantages after implementation of reforms, forecasts political 
and economic consequences of Europe’s enlargement. The model of successful 
reforms has been worked out provided revenues and losses of oligarchs, their ac-
complices, civil servants, new market participants, and application of a new tax 
system.  Done calculations prove that  European enlargement  brings  significant 
economic advantages to new entrants and minor ones to others.     
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1. What is Europe?
It is quite common to talk about Europe, the European Union, Western Eu-
rope, and Central and Eastern Europe. It is not quite clear, however, what most of 
these terms mean. Geography is a matter of social construction. The European 
Union is not a geographical notion, but a well-defined political concept because of its 
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membership of 15 countries. The other terms just mentioned are geographic rather 
than political in character. They are less clear than they seem at first sight. For ex-
ample, Israeli and Turkish football clubs participate in European soccer competi-
tions.  The  Eurovision  Song Contest  also  includes  participants  from Israel  and 
Turkey. This suggests that Israel and Turkey are European countries. It seems like-
ly, however, that many people would not consider these countries part of Europe. 
Yet, Turkey is a candidate-member country of the European Union, even though 
nearly all its territory is located on the Asian continent. 
European borders seem subject to ebb and flow (WRR, 2001). This per-
tains in particular to the eastern borders, of course. In the Middle Ages Europe 
was generally described as extending to the river Don. In the early 18th century 
the border shifted eastwards, on the grounds that the Urals were a more «natu-
ral» border. Analytical geographers employing other environmental criteria again 
subsequently criticized the resultant conclusion that Russia forms part of  Eu-
rope. The lack of consensus concerning the geographical borders is undeniably 
related to the fact that geography remains a matter of social construction.
Definitions of Europe on the basis of historic-cultural criteria provide no 
less elastic borders.  Generally,  the shared experience of Christianity  and the 
common culture to which this has given rise played a prominent role in drawing 
cultural  boundaries.  Various  authors  add  divergent  combinations  of  building 
blocks from European cultural identity, including the Renaissance, the Reforma-
tion,  the  Enlightenment,  and  the  French  Revolution  (Hoggart  and  Johnson, 
1987). Countries that have not shared this series of experiences do not qualify 
for the hallmark «European». Again, subjectivity results in a variety of lists and 
the contours of Europe depend on the country in which these are drawn up. The 
post-communist  governments proved optimistic  in assuming that their  cultural 
definition of Europe – to which they considered to belong and to which in the 
words of Vaclav Havel they ‘wished to return’ – was shared by West Europeans 
(Wallace, 2000, p. 479). A further complication to a cultural approach towards 
the accession problem is that the European culture is certainly not monolithic. 
There are major differences between the various regions. 
Thus, Europe’s borders cannot be determined on the basis of geographical or 
historic-cultural considerations. At the same time it cannot be denied that the Euro-
pean Union functions by the grace of member states that consider themselves to be 
part of the European family and in which the welfare of all is an important considera-
tion for each individual member state. The shared European identity – however 
mythical this may be given the pronounced diversity within the European Union – 
contributes to what Weber termed  Gemeinsamkeitsglaube and also feeds mutual 
confidence and solidarity. In the context of globalization and proliferation of multilat-
eral and interregional organizations, the European Union fulfils a specific regional 
function, which no other organization fulfils or is capable of serving.
In view of these considerations it is not surprising that the European Union 
so far refrained from coming up with an official geographical and/or historic-cul-
tural definition of the concept of the «European State». In 1992, the European 
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Commission argued that the term Europe refers to geographical, historical and 
cultural elements all contributing towards the European identity. However, it re-
jects a static definition, as evidenced by the comment that the common Euro-
pean experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be 
condensed into a simple formula and that each new generation must redefine 
this anew (European Commission, 1992, p. 11). In doing so, the Commission 
also accepts a certain geographical flexibility of the EU – its contours will only 
become clear after many years, and it is neither possible nor opportune to final-
ize the borders at the present time.
2. Transition in Central and Eastern Europe
After the fall of communism a debate started about enlarging the Euro-
pean Union towards  the  East.  Obviously,  the Central  and Eastern  European 
countries were in serious economic trouble after the fall  of  communism. The 
transitional recession in Central and Eastern Europe – whatever the region is 
defined – has been long and diverse. The common heritage of communism im-
plied that all countries in the region began their transition with a productive sys-
tem adapted to the requirements of a command economy, not to a competitive 
environment. Price signals were generally wrong. Given this environment, many 
sectors and enterprises were not viable after price liberalization. Two challenges 
had to be faced (World Bank, 2002):
1. The imposition of  market  discipline on inherited enterprises,  so that  they 
would face the incentive to restructure and, in doing so, become more pro-
ductive and able to compete at the new prices. Failure to do so should lead 
to closure.
2. Encouragement to create new enterprises willing and able to compete in the 
marketplace without seeking special favors from the state.
The fall in GDP in the early 1990s was dominated by the drag of old enter-
prises. Initial conditions were significant factors during the initial period of output 
decline.  Policy reforms,  however,  have also been significant  factors in  differ-
ences among countries in the speed of economic recovery. 
The first impression of what happened in the 1990s gives Table 1 display-
ing the change of GDP between 1989 and 2002. It should be noted that given 
the notorious allocative inefficiency of the centrally planned economies a fall of 
real GDP is not identical to a decline in the standard of living. A decrease of the 
production of weapons and barbed wire, for example, does not necessarily re-
duce  the  welfare  of  individuals.  Nonetheless,  the  transition  from  centrally 
planned to market economies has proved to be painful. Initially, GDP decreased 
considerably in Central and Eastern Europe, but grew from the mid-1990s. In 
2002, GDP exceeded its 1989 level in a number of countries, in some cases 
considerably (Poland and Slovenia). The picture is less favorable in Southeast-
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ern Europe. In Bulgaria and Romania GDP is still below its 1989 level. The same 
holds true for the Baltic countries, though Estonia has come close to the 1989 
level. The slowest development can be observed in the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS). The lack of structural reforms seems the most obvious 
cause of the slow recovery in Southeastern Europe and the CIS. Developments 
are very diverse, however, in the CIS countries. The recovery has hardly begun 
in Moldova and Georgia, while Ukraine is the third slowest recovering country in 
the CIS. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are the only CIS countries where GDP 
seems to have exceeded the 1989 level. They are curious exceptions, since re-
forms – if any – are very slow in both countries. I would not be amazed if the 
statistics appear to be flawed and erroneous.  This caveat pertains to all  CIS 
countries, although to a varying extent.
Table 1. 
Estimated level of real GDP in 2002 (1989=100)
Czech Republic 109
Slovakia 114
Hungary 116
Slovenia 124
Poland 130
Bulgaria 83
Romania 87
Lithuania 76
Latvia 78
Estonia 94
CIS 67
* Moldova 38
* Ukraine 48
* Turkmenistan 109
Source: EBRD (2002).
Ten years of economic reform underline the fact that the elementary insti-
tutional reforms of the transitional phase need to be taken further in order to 
guarantee the persistence of the recovery. The level of flexibility and uncertainty 
is high. Old, inflexible but predictable institutions of the formal planning system 
have largely been dismantled, while new, stabilizing market institutions are still 
in their infancy. Institutional deepening is thus needed. This would mean that 
new, formal rules and institutions of the market economy and democratic system 
will function more effectively and that the social actors will gear their behavior 
and standards increasingly to that system. Fighting corruption and crime is also 
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important. A substantial portion of corruption may be traced back to discretionary 
government intervention and regulation, including subsidies and licenses. Natu-
ral government monopolies and public tendering provide classical examples of 
situations in which large-scale corruption is  commonplace at  higher  levels of 
government (Mauro, 1997). In general, inadequate institutions and undue eco-
nomic intervention by an inefficient  government lacking public  confidence en-
hance the risk of excessive corruption. Reduction of all kinds of protectionism 
and strengthening of the democratic, legal and administrative capacity may help 
in fighting corruption. One thing is certain: the transition will take more time.
3. The political economy of reform
The political economy of reform can be expressed graphically by tracing 
the paths of winners and losers from the transition (World Bank, 2002). Figure 1 
depicts the gains and losses in income accruing to three different constituencies 
at different stages of reform in a typical transition economy:
1. State  sector  workers,  employed in  state  enterprises  and lacking  the 
skills to become new entrants in the competitive market. They face a sharp drop 
in income as market discipline on inherited enterprises calls for downsizing the 
sector, with little hope of any substantial recovery with the intensification of re-
form.
2. Potential  new  entrants,  workers  in  state  enterprises  and  new  en-
trepreneurs with skills to become new entrants in the competitive market. They 
have a classic J-curve pattern of income. They face significant adjustment costs 
at low levels of reform as they exit the state sector. In addition, they realize gains 
only when enough progress has been made with policy and institutional reforms 
to promote and support new entry into the competitive market.
3. Oligarchs and insiders. They begin the transition with substantial de fac-
to control rights over state assets, while they have close ties with the political 
elite inherited from the previous command system. However, because of limited 
skills to compete in the market economy, they face an inverted U-curve of in-
come gains. They are the immediate beneficiaries of liberalization and privatiza-
tion, as de facto control rights over state assets can be converted into de jure 
control and cash flow rights. They reap concentrated gains in the early stages of 
reform from the opportunities for arbitrage and rent seeking that arise if liberal-
ization and privatization are not combined with market discipline and encourage-
ment. But these gains dissipate as further reforms lead to increasing competition 
and market entry.
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Figure 1. 
Winners and Losers from Reform
Income gains 
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R1 = point at which income gains of oligarchs and insiders are maximized
R2 = level of reforms that allows the winners of reforms beyond R1 (new entrants) to com-
pensate for or exercise enough political pressure to neutralize the resistance of oli-
garchs, insiders, and state workers.
Source: World Bank, 2002, p. 93.
Given these patterns of gains and losses, each constituency prefers a dif-
ferent combination of reforms. For potential new entrants, the reform process of-
fers only sacrifices at the beginning of the reform process, but gains when the 
reforms are further advanced. State sector workers prefer the status quo (point 
O), so they reject all reforms. Oligarchs and insiders prefer a partial reform and 
sustain the reform process through  R1,  the point  where their gains are maxi-
mized. Beyond this point further implementation of policy of market discipline 
and encouragement threaten to undermine gains from rent seeking. It is precise-
ly such partial reforms – liberalization without market discipline and with selec-
tive encouragement – that make capture of the state by oligarchs and insiders a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. This has led to a so-called partial reform paradox in many 
transition economies in which governments lack credibility and are highly sus-
ceptible to state capture. If potential new entrants believe at the outset of transi-
tion that oligarchs and insiders will be able to block anything more than partial 
reforms, they will discount substantially the potential gains from any proposed 
radical reforms. Therefore, they will support partial reforms that offer lower costs 
early in the reform process, even though they are more likely to lead to barriers 
to entry. Public support for radical reforms thus depends on perceptions of gov-
ernment credibility in its commitment to follow through with such reforms.
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This analysis leads to the conclusion that there is a high risk of getting 
stuck at a low level of reform (R1) characterized by liberalization without market 
discipline and limited encouragement of new entry. As both insiders and state 
sector workers face declining incomes after R1, these groups have a strong in-
centive to join forces to oppose further economic reforms. It is only when re-
forms reach a critical threshold (for example R2) that the added gains to new en-
trants are enough to allow these winners to either compensate the losses of the 
other groups or to generate enough political pressure to neutralize opposition to 
continued reform.
By recognizing that  different  combinations of  reforms produce different 
configurations of winners and losers, the framework of market discipline and en-
couragement suggests two political challenges in promoting economic reform:
1. Securing the support of potential new entrants for comprehensive re-
forms until wider efficiency gains from discipline and encouragement are real-
ized.
2. Preventing the early winners from liberalization and privatization from 
undermining further reforms that would impose discipline and encourage new 
entry and competition and thus reduce their rents.
To advance reforms, governments should focus on smoothing the curves 
of winners and losers at the initial stages of reform as shown in Figure 1. This 
means lowering the adjustment costs for potential new entrants and reducing the 
high concentration of gains to oligarchs and insiders. One way to do this is by 
strengthening the provision of basic public goods, such as secure property rights 
and a legal and judicial system. This stresses the significance of institutional and 
legal transformation. Another way is by reducing excessively high marginal tax 
rates and broadening the tax base that promotes entry of enterprises from the 
unofficial to the official economy. This can break the vicious circle of informaliza-
tion,  lower tax revenue, and further intensification of tax rates on a shrinking 
base. It goes without saying that developing a rule-based tax administration to 
enforce efficient taxation of the new private sector is also important. The more 
successful  transition  countries  are  in  advancing  reforms  by  smoothing  the 
curves of winners and losers at the initial stages of reform, the more successful 
their accession to the European Union will prove to be.
4. Enlarging the European Union
Apparently, the European Union is attractive to most European non-mem-
ber countries. It is tempting to state that Norway has been very smart by not join-
ing the EU. It is a member of European Free Trade Association (EFTA), while 
EFTA and the European Union have formed the European Economic Area. This 
implies that EFTA members have free access to the European Union market 
and thus enjoy the benefits of a larger market, while they retain some indepen-
dence in areas such as monetary and foreign security policy. Moreover, they do 
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not have to bear the financial burden in the form of contributions into the Euro-
pean Union budget. Why, then, did most of the EFTA states join the European 
Union in 1995? First, as EFTA members they did not participate in the process 
whereby internal market rules were set. As a result, they had to accept them as 
they had been enacted without the possibility  to influence the drafting of the 
rules. Second, political neutrality lost much of its significance after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. To countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Austria neutrali-
ty was not a meaningful issue anymore and, thus, no obstacle to their admission 
to the European Union in 1995. On the contrary, Finnish voters probably voted 
for the European Union accession primarily because of political concern about 
Russia’s intentions. Participation in the European Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy was no challenge to any of these countries after the ending of 
the Cold War.
The next  European Union  enlargement  mainly  pertains  to  Central  and 
Eastern  European Countries.  Eight  countries  in  the region – Estonia,  Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia – and 
two mini-states in the Mediterranean – Malta and (the Greek part of) Cyprus – 
will join the European Union in May 2004. The acceding countries will need to 
apply to join the European Economic Area, while this accession should take ef-
fect at the same time as the accession to the European Union. The enlarged Eu-
ropean  Union  will  have  direct  frontiers  with  Russia  as  well  as  borders  with 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. It will also enjoy direct access to the Black Sea, 
which will lead to intensified contacts with countries of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. The enlarged European Union will  also surround the Kaliningrad oblast, 
which is part of Russia. After the enlargement the European Union will have sev-
eral hundreds of thousands of Russian speaking citizens, living mainly in Estonia 
and Latvia. Thus, it will be important for the enlarged European Union to deepen 
its  relationship  with  Russia,  Ukraine  and  other  CIS  countries.  Accession  of 
Ukraine and other CIS countries is another story, however, and seems highly 
unlikely in the foreseeable future.
The European Union assesses the preparedness for membership of the 
10 applicant countries from Central  and Eastern Europe1 on the basis of the 
three Copenhagen criteria (from June 1993): a political criterion, an economic 
criterion, and the ability to take on the  acquis2. As the applicant countries pro-
gressively  adopt  the  acquis  communeautaire in  preparation  for  membership, 
they are given an opportunity to participate in European Union programs. This is 
1 In addition to the countries that will join the European Union in 2004 Bulgaria and Romania 
applied for membership, but their indicative date for accession has been set at 2007.
2 These criteria are:
1. The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities.
2. The  existence  of  a  functioning  market  economy,  as well  as  the ability  to  cope with 
competitive pressures and market forces within the European Union. 
3. The acquis: the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
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provided for in the Europe Agreements. The gradual integration of the Central 
and Eastern Europe countries into different programs enables their representa-
tives to become more familiar with European Union legislation and proceedings 
and to take advantage of member states’ experience in areas such as public 
procurement, the right of residence and VAT. Nevertheless, this does not imply 
giving decision-making power to countries that are not yet members of the Euro-
pean Union. 
Never before has the European Union envisaged an enlargement of such 
dimensions. The enlargement of 2004 will add 75 million people to the European 
Union’s population of 370 million. The number of applicant countries and the dif-
ferences between them are also greater than ever before. Their average GDP 
per capita is nearly 40% of the European Union average in 2001 and total GDP 
of the European Union would rise by nearly 5% (European Commission, 2002). 
The combined GDP of the eight new members in Central and Eastern Europe 
with their population of 75 million is lower (approximately 82%) compared to that 
of the Netherlands alone (with its population of 16 million). After accession all 
new member states will be net recipients of European Union funds.
The Central and Eastern European countries will need to prepare them-
selves for participation in the monetary union once they have joined the Euro-
pean Union. Table 2 summarizes both the  acquis to be adopted by the new 
member states and the well-known criteria for accession to the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). The EMU has set in train an enormous deepening of the 
internal market and has resulted in divergent processes of European policy coor-
dination. The European Union member states’ budgetary policy is constrained 
by the Stability and Growth Pact. So it limits member states’ latitude to pursue 
their own budgetary policy. Furthermore, it compels countries to draw up multi-
year convergence programs and to take part in the new exchange rate mecha-
nism (ERM-2) some time after accession. Within this system the new member 
states must maintain a fixed but adjustable parity (central rate) for at least two 
years between the national currency and the Euro within a range of plus or mi-
nus 15%. This is a formal prerequisite for qualifying for joining the EMU. 
Since national monetary policy is no longer possible, economic fluctua-
tions in the EMU must be absorbed by other instruments, such as enhanced 
flexibility of prices and/or wages, and increased labor mobility between sectors 
and between regions. The obligations of Central and Eastern European coun-
tries not only pertain to their exchange rate policy and economic policy, but also 
to more or less regulatory dimensions. These dimensions include the existence 
of central bank independence, a ban on central bank direct monetary financing 
of budget deficits, and the prohibition of privileged government access to finan-
cial institutions.
Table 2. 
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Criteria for accession to the Economic and Monetary Union
Adoption of the acquis communeautaire Maastricht convergence criteria
Central  and  Eastern  European  countries 
must adopt the acquis, especially:
• Exchange rate policy is of common in-
terest; take part in economic policy co-
ordination
• National  central  bank  legislation  can-
not  counter  the  independence  of  the 
ESCB
• Capital movements must be liberalized 
before accession
• Rules and supervisory mechanisms for 
a healthy banking system and effective 
financial system must be introduced
• Government deficit: < 3% of GDP
• National debt: < 60% of GDP
• Exchange rate:  within  normal  fluctua-
tion margins of the EMS; no unilateral 
devaluation or revaluation
• Long-term interest rate: not more than 
2%-points higher than that of no more 
than 3 member states that  have per-
formed  best  (sustainability  of  conver-
gence)
• Price stability: inflation cannot be more 
than 1.5%-points higher than that of a 
maximum  of  3  member  states  that 
have performed best
Most of the applicant countries have already adopted a part of the neces-
sary legislation to bring their monetary system in line with the requirements of 
the EMU acquis and the Maastricht conditions. This applies in particular to safe-
guarding the independence of the central bank, excluding the possibility of privi-
leged government access to central banks, and strengthening the supervision of 
the financial sector. Several of the applicant countries are in fact already in com-
pliance with a number of convergence criteria and/or have anchored their ex-
change rate to the Euro or have taken the Euro as the reference currency in a 
system of floating exchange rates.
5. Economic implications
Enlargement of the Monetary Union will most likely offer both static and 
dynamic prosperity benefits that are comparable to the long-term advantages of 
introduction of the Euro. For trade and investment within the region it will mean 
the disappearance of damaging exchange rate fluctuations as well as the trans-
actions costs associated with the conversion of currencies. The problems and 
risks of enlargement can be expected to occur primarily in the short and medium 
term in the run-up to Euro participation. This should be considered against the 
background of the dynamics brought about by the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty 
aims at further broadening and deepening of economic integration and reformu-
lation of economic objectives, including sustained non-inflationary growth, con-
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vergence in economic performance, price stability, healthy public finances, fa-
vorable monetary conditions, and balance of payment equilibrium. To this end 
the treaty outlined a provisional program consisting of three stages. As a result, 
the EMU’s monetary policy has been centralized, the political independence of 
the European Central  Bank (ECB) has been guaranteed, and the ECB is re-
quired to pursue policy giving priority to the goal of price stability over any other 
economic goal.
The Dutch Central  Planning Bureau (CPB,  2001)  has adopted a  com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the world economy (WorldScan) to 
explore the implications of European Union enlargement. This model makes an 
explicit distinction between a number of regions, including the European Union 
on the one hand, and Poland, Hungary and the other Central and Eastern Euro-
pean accession countries3 on the other hand. In exploring the economic impact 
of the European Union enlargement with this model, economic variables in 2020 
are compared with the results in a baseline scenario. In the baseline, the GDP 
growth is based on long-term projections of the World Bank. Three shocks of the 
European Union enlargement are:
1. A gradual removal of the remaining formal trade barriers in agriculture 
and food processing and the adoption of the common external tariff (CET). Ac-
cession of the Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union 
implies a move from an almost free-trade area towards a customs union. This 
means that all remaining bilateral formal trade barriers will be abolished.
2. Accession to the internal market.
3. Free movement of labor.
Table 3 shows the long-term effect of these shocks of the European Union 
enlargement on GDP. To put the effects of these shocks into perspective, the ef-
fects of the Europe agreements (i.e., the removal of formal bilateral trade barri-
ers in manufacturing) have been included in the last column. As the bottom line 
shows, third countries appear hardly to be affected, so we can focus on the ef-
fects on the European Union and the accession countries. The effect of elimina-
tion of bilateral tariffs and the adoption of the common external tariff on GDP is 
larger for Poland than for the other applicant countries. This results from the fact 
that the initial bilateral tariffs between the European Union and Poland are high-
er than those between the European Union and the other accession countries 
(so that more efficiency improvements can be reaped). The GDP-effects of ac-
cession to the internal market are substantially larger than the effects of moving 
towards a customs union. Moreover, they are for the applicant countries approxi-
mately twice the size of the effects of the Europe agreements. These large ef-
fects are due to the following reasons:
3 The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The Baltic States are 
not included in the analysis, since the data neither distinguishes these countries as sepa-
rately nor as a block.
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Table 3. 
Long term effect (in %) on real GDP of three shocks of the European Union 
enlargement and Europe agreements
Customs 
union
Internal 
market
Free 
movement 
of labor
Europe 
agreements
Hungary 1.9 9.0 –1.3 (0.8)a 5.6
Poland 4.3 5.8 –1.4 (0.6)a 2.3
CEEC-5b 1.0 3.4 –2.3 (1.1)a 1.9
EU-15 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.1
Third countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
a. GDP per capita.
b. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania.
Source: CPB (2001).
1. The shock is large compared to the formal barriers to trade.
2. Accession  to  the  internal  market  refers  to  a  reduction  in  real  trade 
costs, whereas formal trade barriers reflect distortions in relative prices.
3. Higher return to capital and lower production cost of investment lead to 
additional investment.
Finally, the migration shock (free movement of labor) results in a drop of 
total GDP in the accession countries because of the outflow of labor. GDP per 
capita, however, increases due to the reduced labor supply. Since capital is not 
perfectly mobile across countries, the lower labor supply leads to an increase of 
the capital/labor ratios in the applicant countries, which raises the marginal prod-
uct of labor and thereby wages. For similar reasons, GDP per capita in the Euro-
pean Union decreases. The lower capital/labor ratios cause a decline in labor 
productivity and thus a fall in wages. The effect is small, however, because of 
the modest increase in the population size.  Total GDP increases slightly in the 
European Union as a result of the population growth.
Overall, the economic implications for the applicant countries tend to be 
significant. Though the exact size of the effects depends on specification of the 
model and is subject to debate, it seems obvious that the economic effects of 
enlargement of the European Union are considerably larger for the accession 
countries than for the European Union. Compared to the customs union and free 
movement of labor, accession to the internal market yields the largest economic 
effects. If  the impact of  the three shocks of enlargement for the Central  and 
Eastern European countries is taken together, the GDP per capita increases by 
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more than 8% in the long run. The effects for European Union countries are gen-
erally positive, though very small. The Dutch GDP per capita, for example, rises 
by a mere 0.15% in the long run. Once again, this suggests that the economic 
benefits of  the European Union enlargement mainly  accrue to  the accession 
countries rather than the current European Union member states.
From a strictly economic point of view, the European Union will hardly be 
affected by enlargement. It does not matter to European Union countries – or for 
the Euro area members – whether the applicant countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe join the European Union and/or the Euro area or not. Even if trade with 
the ten applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe doubles over the next 
decade, as can be expected, it will  remain small  compared to intra-European 
Union (or intra-Euro area) trade and a small fraction of the Euro-area’s external 
trade.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  applicant  countries  could  damage the  European 
Union because their financial systems are minuscule compared to that of the 
current Euro area and because their banking systems are increasingly dominat-
ed by institutions from the European Union. Enlargement may create institutional 
problems, however. The governing council of the ECB, for example, would then 
comprise 33 members (6 from the Executive Board of the ECB plus 27 gover-
nors from national central banks – including Malta and Cyprus). This issue is 
similar to the general issues raised by enlargement for the governance of the 
European Union of more than 25 members. The European Commission cannot 
function well if it would grow even larger than its current 20 members. 
Thus, the enlargement process seems more important politically than eco-
nomically. The European Union’s main reason for existence has been and still is 
to create and preserve stability in Europe. Similarly, the rationale behind the cur-
rently envisioned enlargement is not the transfer of money to the Central and 
Eastern European countries, but the preservation of stability in the new Europe.
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